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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the divestiture of divisions, product 
lines and subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. The various types and 
methods of divestiture are discussed along with the numerous reasons 
corporate managers give for divestitures. The problems of empirical 
research specific to the divestiture phenomenon are illustrated with 
special emphasis on the loss of financial performance information of the 
divested unit once it is sold. The primary objective of this study is 
to examine the possibility that reduction of systematic risk can serve 
as a major motive for divestitures through the analysis of beta coeffi-
cient values obtained for the divesting firms, selling firms and divested 
units involved in a sample of 30 divestitures covering a period of 1952 
through 1978. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his major adviser, 
Dr. James F. Jackson for his guidance, patience and assistance throughout 
this study. 
A note of thanks is also given to Mrs. Irene Larson for the excel-
lence of the final copy of this report. 
And finally, a special thanks for my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Jon B. 
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Definitions of Divestment 
As with many terms in the world of business, divestitures can re-
present many different forms of activity. A divestiture may involve an 
entire division or subsidiary of a parent firm or a product line or 
service that may or may not comprise a complete business with facili-
ties that are separate and distinct from those utilized in the other 
company operations. 
Some of the more inventive forms of divestitures are spin-offs, 
split-offs and split-ups: The spin-off is a distribution by a parent 
corporation of the stock of a subsidiary to the shareholders of the par-
ent where the shareholders now hold stock in both the parent and the 
subsidiary; the split-off is the exchange by the parent of stock of a 
subsidiary for the stock of the parent which is technically a repur-
chase of the parent's stock; and the split-up is the distribution by 
the parent of the stock of all its subsidiaries which is technically a 
liquidation. 
Divestment, as considered in this paper, is the process of elimi-
nating a portion of the enterprise and the subsequent use of the re-
sources which are freed for some other purpose. A divestment takes 
place when there is a disposal of company assets or entire divisions or 
subsidiaries, as well as the discontinuance of an activity which has 
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which had been associated with those assets. Thus divestment occurs 
when there is a complete cessation of a part of the enterprise and the 
disposition of some, or all, of the facilities connected with it by 
sale or transfer. Divestment may concern a manufacturing operation, a 
marketing activity, or a research function, as well as the facilities 
and personnel attached to it. It is neither the sale of the entire 
company nor the shutting down or ~losing of all or a portion of a 
company. Following the divestment, the divesting company continues 
as a distinct, viable business entity. 
The Divestment Process 
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The forms and manner of payment for divestitures are as diverse as 
in the mergers and acquisitions area which is limited only by a few 
government regulations and managements' imagination. The spin-off, 
split-off, and split-up, mentioned above, are facilitated by the ex-
change of stock between parties but divestitures may also be classified 
as a sale of assets. There are advantages to either manner of trans-
action which are too numerous to be covered adequately here. The instru-
ments used for payment have involved cash, notes, common and preferred 
stock, an exchange of assets, and any combination of these instruments. 
The purchasers of di~ested divisions or subsidiaries are also quite 
diverse. Although most divestments are sold to other corporations, man-
agement of the divested unit often are the purchasers through what is 
termed a "management buyout" which is usually financ~d by the selling 
corporation. Even the employees can get into the act through the gov-
ernment-subsidized Employee Stock Ownership Trust plan. The purchasers 
may also include more than one corporation through a joint venture or 
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consortium. For example, Kennecott Copper Incorporated sold its Peabody 
Coal subsidiary for $1.2 billion to.a group of seven corporations con-
sisting of mining concerns, an insurance firm, and even an Australian 
holding company. 1 
The price of a divestment can be quite large as well as the possible 
capital gains or losses from the sale to the divesting firm as witnessed 
by the sale of the Texas Pacific Oil subsidiary of Seagram Company Lim-
ited to Sun Oil Company for $2.3 billion which was more than eight times 
the price Seagram originally paid for it. 2 
Many government agencies can involve themselves in divestments. 
This usually occurs because of the possible anticompetitive/antitrust 
ramifications of a divestment concerning the acquiring firm. But the 
government itself may be the initiator of the sale by the use of forced 
divestiture. The agencies involved consist of the Antitrust Division 
of the Justice Department, the Securities and Exchange Conunission, and 
the Federal Trade Commission. 
Acouisitions and Divestments 
Historically, corporate use of acquisitions has played an important 
role in the development of the divestment option because in one sense, 
the relation between divestment and acquisition is direct and obvious: 
nearly every divestment is an acquisition for someone else. Addition-
ally, many companies today are divesting and acquiring divisions or sub-
sidiaries simultaneously, for example, the Signal Companies divested 
themselves of Signal Oil and Gas, Inc., in 1974 and immediately purchased 
controlling interest in Universal Oil Products, Inc. 3 
While acquisition and divestiture share certain characteristics, 
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their differences are both numerous and crucial, and they require dif-
ferent approaches, different kinds of information, different methods of 
analysis, and different management practices. 
Moreover, they are negotiated in a completely different psychologi-
cal atmosphere. For one thing, unlike an acquisition, a divestiture can 
immediately hurt. It can hurt financially because the divesting company 
may be penalizing its income statement to strengthen its balance sheet, 
which is usually less visible to the investing public. It hurts emotion-
ally, because it is always possible that a divesture can reflect a mis-
take in judgment or incompetence on somebody's part. 
Second, a divestiture decision is one of the least reversible de-
cisions management can make. An acquiring company, on the other hand, 
has at least some time and space for maneuver, and can take variety of 
actions that will enhance the future profitability of an acquisition. 
Divestiture is the antithesis of an expansion move and is a way out of 
a problem. 
Third, the risks and rewards in a divestiture are different. A pur-
chaser of a division usually takes a risk in the expectation that he can 
get more out of his purchase than he paid for it. Some of the sellers, 
on the other hand, may want to reduce operating losses, reduce implicit 
opportunity losses, reduce investment requirements, or reduce their risk. 
Additionally, the degree of uncertainty in valuation differs because the 
acquiring corporation must only decide the value of a prospective acqui-
sition to himself, whereas the divestor must decide not only the value 
to himself but the value to someone else as well. 
Acquisitions are intimately related with divestitures in many ways. 
A corporation may be forced by the government under the auspices of 
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antitrust to divest itself of some business before acquiring another one. 
This was the case when International Telephone and Telegraph Incorporated 
indicated its plans to acquire Hartford Fire Insurance Company. The Jus-
tice Department agreed to allow the acquisition only if ITT would divest 
itself of a number of its existing operations including Avis-Rent-A-Car 
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System and Automatic Canteen Company. 
A divestment may be the result of a preconceived plan to acquire a 
business and then later divest itself of those activities not wanted or 
needed, either because they are duplicated in the buying firm or they 
are not related to the major line of business. It is understandable that 
a firm would pursue an acquisition policy of acquiring only those seg-
ments of another firm which it actually intends to make a permanent addi-
tion to its own business. But this may not always be possible since 
quite often the seller wishes to unload a "package" including all its 
unwanted activities, and will sell only on this basis. 5 Sometimes the 
need for divestment of a portion of an acquisition is recognized at the 
time of acquisition and immediate steps are taken to divest, but often, 
the unwanted activity is passed along as part of the acquisition and left 
to flounder until new management steps in. Such was the case when Pep-
sico, Inc., acquired Frito-Lay, Inc., which had a small condiment opera-
tion that was unrelated to both distribution systems. This unit was 
6 
divested only after several years of mediocre performance. 
Corporate directors sometimes divest segments of their own companies 
or parts of an acquired business to finance specific acquisitions. Love-
joy illustrates how one management accomplished this. 
Company A agreed to pay $5,800,000 to acquire Company B. A 
10% down payment was made at the time of the purchase, with 
the rest to be paid over a number of years. Retirement of 
this debt was assisted by nonrecurring profits of over 
$1,000,000 from the sale of Company A of Company B's inven-
tory; about $400,000 in cash obtained through the sale by A 
of part B's plant, property, and equipment; a.pd a $6QO,OOO 
tax loss as an offset to Company A's profits. 
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What has been occurring recently is an increase in divestitures of 
businesses which had been obtained originally by a company as part of 
an ambitious acquisition program. Quite often such companies end up 
acquiring a collection of unrelated, unprofitable products and businesses 
for which too high a price is paid. Later, it is frequently necessary to 
devote a major portion of the company resources to rehabilitate these ac-
quisitions. In some cases, these rehabilitation efforts are unsuccessful 
and, in the end, divestment becomes the only possible solution to the 
problem. Some firms, especially the so-called "conglomerates", find that 
they have expanded too fast and in too many directions at once, and thus 
have overextended their managerial and financial resources. In the pre~· 
eess of implementing a program of mergers and acquisitions, it is easy to 
gather a portfolio of businesses which are unrelated or possess weak man-
agements. The job of assimilating these operations can result in massive 
problems. Frequently, the assimilation can be facilitated when the less 
promising ventures are divested, so that major effort can be devoted to 
those with the greatest promise. 
In many acquisitions the divested unit's management team will stay 
with the unit or be assimilated into the buying firm's organization. 
Boyle's research emphasizes this point by showing that top management of 
the acquired unit stayed on indefinitely in 51 percent of the acquisitions 
studied. 8 This results in having key positions in a subsidiary filled by 
people who were outsiders and not recruited in the usual manner. This 
could lead to eventual divestment of the unit because of incompatible 
managements as Bing states: 
In far more cases than the participants realize or are ever 
willing to admit, the reasons for a subsidiary's difficulties, 
failures, and eventual sale are personality clashes and com-
munication problems between subsidiary management and the 
management of the parent company,9 
Several empirical tests have shown that firms that have grown by 
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use of acquisitions use significantly more amount of leverage than any 
f . 10 other type irm. In many cases divestment has been used as a strategy 
to reduce this high debt level. Ling-Tempco-Vought, Inc., has divested 
a vast amount of its subsidiaries in the past to reduce debt that was 
costing over one million dollars a week. Westinghouse sold many of 
its business units, including the well-documented sale of its appliance 
business to White Consolidated Industries, to lower its debt from 1.1 
billion dollars to 453 million dollars. 
Although there is a vast array of reasons that corporations may pur-
port for their divestitures, the objective here is to present an intro-
duction to many of the possible relationships between acquisitions and 
divestitures. The literature review will delineate further these rela-
tionships, such as a possible causal relation between the two phenomena. 
Although the subject of this study is divestments, it is impossible to 
cover this subject without taking note of the area of acquisitions. 
Lack of Divestment Information and Literature 
Although there has been a proliferation of empirical research and 
general literature about acquisitions and mergers, relatively little has 
been written about the related field of divestitures. This dearth of 
information is curious when one considers the emotional content and ethi-
cal questions involved in divestitures as well as the ramifications it 
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holds for management. 
The major reason that mergers and acquisitions have received so 
much attention is the continuing interest by legislators in the eco-
nomic concentration of industries that may be correlated to merger acti-
vity. This raises the issues of monopoly and the legislature's antitust 
activities. 
But before more empirical research can be done on the divestiture 
phenomenon some significant informational barriers have to be overcome. 
The first informational barrier is management's concern for secrecy dur-
ing the pre-divestment and post-divestment periods. Hayes and Lovejoy11 
give several reasons for this secrecY, but the main reasons involve the 
negative effects that this information can have on distributors, stock-
holders, and employees, as well as the aid that divestment information 
can give to competitors. Also, the aura of failure that has surrounded 
divestment proceedings in the past have made top management reluctant 
to talk about their divestment activity. Sometimes the top men in the 
division being sold are unaware that their unit is being considered for 
divestment. 
The second barrier is the absence of meaningful financial data on 
a divestment candidate, be it product line, corporate division, or even 
subsidiary. Boyle devotes an entire chapter of his study to this in-
formation loss from conglomerate expansion. 12 His study reveals the 
economic implications of the loss of financial information of businesses 
that have been acquired by conglomerate firms. These corporations' fi-
nancial statements leave outsiders with little indication of how divi-
sions and individual product markets are performing. 
Once a division or subsidiary has been divested or acquired, it is 
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almost impossible for corporate outsiders to get any useful information 
concerning rates of return, individual balance sheet and income figures, 
or even the transaction price, if the parent corporations are not will-
ing to disclose. The very information most needed for empirical re-
search in its most detailed form is practically eliminated by the 
transaction itself. 
The implications of the loss of financial performance information 
of corporate divisions and subsidiaries are evident if the assumption 
for an efficiently functioning capital market is that resources will be 
allocated to their most efficient use. For the market to allocate re-
sources among competing uses, accurate and timely information concerning 
these uses must be available to the market participants. Without this 
information, investors are unable to make rational decisions and manage-
ment incompetence goes undetected. Additionally, free competition is 
abated because possible entrants do not have the detailed information 
needed to decide if it will be profitable to enter specific sectors of 
industries. 
The only known empirical study that was able to cultivate any finan-
cial information from large, conglomerate corporations about their indi-
vidual product lines and divisions was a study by Stanley Boyle. 13 This 
was possible only because Boyle was commissioned by the Federal Trade 
Commission which required the nine corporations to cooperate with him. 
Boyle's focus was on conglomerate performance and not divestitures. 
The lack of empirical research on the divestiture phenomenon holds:· 
the same implications as the lack of performance information with one 
exception: It is assumed that management has enough internal financial 
performance information to make rational resource allocation decisions, 
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the point is that they do not make this information available to out-
siders. The lack of empirical research inhibits the ability to compare 
management performance and market performance. 
Purp~ of Study 
It is intended that this empirical study will add to the much 
needed body of information and research on divestitures. Specifically, 
this study intends to develop information about the parties involved in 
a divestiture: the acquiring firm, selling firm, and divested division 
or subsidiary. Through the analysis of market rates of return of the 
three entities, it is possible to see if there are any strategies com-
mon to all selling firms in the process of divestment as well as strat-
egies common to all acquiring firms. Also it is possible to compare 
strategies of acquiring firms and selling firms involved in the divest-
ments. The strategies in question are portfolio management and finan-
cial management. These strategies will be discussed later in the 
concept of the study. 
Summary 
The next chapter will review the literature on the subject of di-
vestitures and areas related to divestitures. Chapter three will dis-
cuss the concept of the study, methodology, and analysis of the data. 
Chapter four will cover the findings of the research and conclusions 
drawn from these findings. 
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Some of the causes of a recent increase in the frequency of dives-
titures is discussed in this chapter, such as, the changes in peculiar-
ities of the tax laws and corporate financial reporting requirements of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Other economic and structural 
changes are reviewed as possible causes of the recent increase in di-
vestitures. 
The divestment phenomen will be reviewed in its historical per-
spective as it relates to the three merger waves witnessed by the U.S. 
economy. 
But the major point that will be brought out in this chapter is 
that a change in managerial philosophy has gradually occurred. Numerous 
corporations have engaged in seemingly frenzied merger activity start-
ing in the late 1950s and continuing into the 1980s. But corporate 
management has now become more cautious about its ability to manage a 
disarray of somewhat unrelated business activities. The portfolio con-
cept is now being applied more and more to corporations by management 
as a constant performance review of subunits of the ~orporation. The 
goal of this is to better refine the organization in the interrelated-
ness of these subunits. Divestiture has now lost its stigma as a show 
of failure and is now seen as a viable method of improving the portfolio 
12 
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of divisions, subsidiaries, and product lines. 
Merger Waves and Divestitures 
As already noted, there are many possible relationships between ac-
quisitions and divestitures. Many authors purport that there may even 
be a causal relation between them as the merger/acquisition boom of the 
late 1960s frequently has been cited as the ultimate cause of heavy di-
vestment activity of the 1970-1980 period. 1 These authors generally 
agree that in the 1960s, moderate liquidity, high price-earnings ratios! 
liberal accounting rules, and a buoyant economy and stock market have 
2 been the major factors of increased merger activities in the 1960s. 
Hayes states this increased divestment activity represents a "merger 
aftermarket", which is the market in those operating units or divisions 
which are part of an acquired company but do not fit the strategy and 
f h . . 3 structure o t e acquiring company. Duhaime and Patton state that the 
"frenzied" merger/acquisition activity of the late 1960s resulted in 
poor analysis of acquisition candidates, which is the cause of heavy di-
4 
vestments in the 1970s. 
It has been well established that the U.S. economy has witnessed 
5 
three periods of increasing merger activity or merger "waves" If in-
creased merger activity is thought to cause a period of increased di-
vestment or merger aftermarket, then it may be plausible that each 
merger wave in history has been followed by a divestment wave. There-
fore, at this point each merger wave will be briefly discussed with a 
look at their relations to divestitures. Most of this historical review 
6 is from Samuel Reid's book on mergers and the economy. 
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The First Merge~ Wave 
The first merger wave centered around the period 189.8-1902. This 
event has been referred to by many as a "classical era in economic de-
velopment." The action in this movement was extensive and rapid since 
this was the shortest major merger wave on record. During this five-
year wave there were 2,653 reported mergers, with 1,208 mergers reported 
in 1899 alone •. Reid states that "there were 318 important industrial 
consolidations in existence in 1903, of the total, 236 had been formed 
"7 
since the beginning of 1898. Most students of this period agree that 
it was the classical era of consolidations. Consolidations in this con-
text means an amalgamation or fusion of two or more firms into a new 
firm with a different capital structure. It is generally considered the 
consolidation or "many-at-once" form of merger occurred more often than 
the acquisition which is a "one-at-a-time" form of merger where generally 
a larger firm absorbs a smaller firm and the larger firm retains its 
identity. During this period, consoldiations dominated the merger acti-
vity of all but one of the two-digit industries. Since many of these 
consolidations were comprehensive in nature, encompassing large numbers 
of firms in the same industry, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
majority of mergers were horizontal. 8 
A horizontal merger is considered one involving firms which are en-
gaged principally in the same industry whether or not in the same geo-
graphic location. The motive for the majority of these consolidations 
was attaining monopolies within industries. Moody studies 92 large in-
dustrial mergers of this period and found that 78 of these mergers con-
trolled 50 percent or more of the output of their industry, and 26 
9 controlled 80 percent or more. It is interesting to note that most 
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literature on this era agrees that the outside professional promoter 
. 1 . . . . t . d · f h lO played a dominant roe in initia ion an consummation o t e merger. 
Although management has always been involved in the merger activity, 
this first era saw most of the aggressive actions being taken by pro-
meters motivated by personal gain resulting from the consummated merger. 
In contrast to the current situation, in which stock ownership is 
diverse, during this first period, individuals possessed large blocks 
of stock as well as a high percentage of ownership of a firm. The major 
forces lending to increased merger activity in this first and all subse-
quent merger waves was an increase in speculation in asset values, ex-
cessive demand for securities lending to increased stock prices and a 
prosperous economy. 
Reid summarizes the factors peculiar only to the first merger wave 
which enhanced merger formation. 
The leading factors ... appeared to be the newly achieved 
development of a broad and strong capital market, and the 
existence of institutions which enabled organizers of mer-
gers to use this market. The favorable business conditions 
made practicable larger units of business enterprise. This 
in turn permitted the centralization in one corporate rtruc-
ture, of control of a large part of an industry ..• 1 
The movement reached a peak in 1901 with the formation of the bil-
lion dollar United States Steel Corporation and ended with a sharp de-
pression of 1903 consisting of a collapse of the stock market and a 
decline in business conditions. 
A review of the literature concerning the resulting success or 
failure of these consolidations after the merge wave subsided is rather 
inconclusive. . 12 13 Dewing and Weston conclude that the majority of these 
mergers were unsuccessful while Livermore14 and Nelson15 conclude that 
there were an almost equal number of gainers and losers. 
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The only divestiture of note resulting from this merger wave was the 
celebrated forced divestiture of Standard Oil of New Jersey, which lead 
to the distribution of shares of its 33 subsidiaries in 1911. 
Although business enterprises did decline in value or were totally 
liquidated or sold outright following this merger wave, it is theorized 
that no trend of divestitures of any magnitude followed this wave for 
the following reasons: 
(1) Since most mergers were in the form of consolidations rather 
than acquisitions, this deterred divestment of subsidiaries be-
cause business units were difficult if not impossible to separate 
for the parent. 
(2) The merger wave was so dramatic and short that many-iarge 
firms, which were the result of consolidations, were still 
trying to determine their existing capacity rather than divest 
themselves of capacity. They were still in the midst of re-
organization and digestion of the consolidated units and were 
not capable of divestment analysis. 
(3) Since most mergers were of the horizontal form, a divest-
ment could result in the increase of direct competition. 
(4) The newly developed capital and security markets would 
penalize any parent firm of a divestiture as a sign of failure. 
Since there was a considerable amount of concentration of stock 
ownership and corporate control to a few holders, they would 
surely react nega~ively to any efforts of divestiture. 
(5) Management of the merging firms took a subservient role to 
that of the professional promoters in bringing the two firms 
together in the consummation of the mergers. This left management 
17 
with little analytical experience needed to initiate divestment activity. 
Additionally, there were no outsiders promoting divestitures as they had 
mergers. 
The Second Merger Wave 
Although there was an increase in merger activity in the early 
1920s, the real thrust took place in the period 1924-1929. There were 
5,846 mergers from 1925 to 1931, with a peak reached in 1929 when 1,245 
mergers were recorded. This is more than twice as many reported mergers 
during the turn-of-the-century wave. There is a particular lack of data 
on this second wave which makes it a difficult one to measure but the 
literature does reveal that the majority of the mergers were of the one-
. . . f 16 at-a-time acqu1s1t1on orm. Since acquisition relaced the consolida-
tion form, the average size of the merger was most likely smaller than 
during the first wave, meaning a less spectacular wave. The second wave 
witnessed the increased use of vertical and circular types of merger and 
the resulting decline of the horizontal. In this context, circular mer-
ger involves product extension; that is, it provides a firm with nonsim-
ilar products or services that utilize the same distribution channels. 
The motive for most mergers in this period was to achieve or to preserve 
existing oligopoly positions in many industries. 17 
In this period, the professional promoters of the first wave were 
replaced by investment bankers as the major protagonists of merger acti-
vity, as Reid emphasizes 
that as many as nine out of the ten mergers of the 
second wave had the investment banker at the core. But 
management assumed a larger role in the promotion, relative 
to their role during the first wave, because the acquisition 
is relatively less complicated to consummate than the consoli-
dation.18 
18 
The banker's incentive was that by taking an active part in the 
working out of the combination, often by assuming the role of the actual 
promoter, the banker entitled himself to receive a substantial stock 
interest in the new company in reward for his services. He also re-
ceived benefits from profits on the sale of securities for the new 
company. 
As in the first wave, favorable business conditions existed in this 
second wave: Rising security prices and wholesale prices, favorable 
capital market and a prosperous business atmosphere. During this pro-
longed prosperity, acquiring firms were also expanding by internal 
growth methods, and thus new investment spending was taking place simul-
taneously with the formation of mergers. 
This extensive merger wave was followed by the most severe depres-
sion in American history. This immediate change of state took most of 
the merging firms by surprise and left little time for the sometimes 
slow process of divestment. Indeed, it is quite plausible that the mar-
ket for divestitures had completely dried up as most firms were strug-
gling to keep plants open rather than finding a bargain-priced divestment 
from another competitor. 
The Current Merger Wave 
The current merger wave started around 1955 and has continued at a 
high rate of activity since then with no end yet in sight. This wave 
has already surpassed the combined numbers of mergers in both previous 
waves as well as the financial magnitudes involved in both waves. The 
acquisition form of merger is still more dominant than the now almost 
nonexistent consolidation, but the most striking characteristic of the 
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current wave is that acquisitions have been much more of the conglomer-
ate variety. The conglomerate form of acquisition is where the firm 
switches from single to multiple products and acquires firms with no 
apparent similarities in production or marketing activities. A marked 
change from the previous merger episodes is that the principle promo-
tion efforts have been generated by the managers of the acquiring firms 
rather than the outsiders of the two previous waves. 19 Not only has 
management taken the leading role, but many firms have established an 
aggressive attitude of seeking out acquisition candidates. An illus-
tration of this is that out of 93 acquisition-oriented firms studied by 
20 Ansoff, et al., 70 percent pursued opportunities of acquisition and of 
the candidates whose acquisitions were consummated, 69 percent of the 
initial contacts were made directly by the acquiring firms and not by 
an intermediary. 
Firms have begun to establish acquisition departments within their 
organizations and law firms and investment bankers have developed spec-
ialized staffs to aid firms in their search, analysis and consummation 
of acquisitions and mergers. 
Current Increase in Divestitures 
On the heels of this current merger wave is a rapid increase in di-
vestituresof divisions and subsidiaries. Divestitures of divisions or 
subsidiaries have risen from under 700 in 1968 to 1,400 in 1970, and to 
over 1,900 in 1971. 21 Prior to this, divestment frequency was quite 
low. Vignola indicates that divestment frequency was below 100 per year 
in the late 1950s and rose to 150 per year range by the mid-1960s. 22 
Actually, divestitures are a part of the merger wave and have become 
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more representative of the acquisitions of the 1970s, as more firms are 
buying portions of companies rather than whole firms. For example, 41 
percent of mergers in 1971 consisted of divestments which is up from 
1970. 23 16 percent in 
What are the reasons for this increase in divestment activity? Is 
it the simple fact that corporate management has finally faced the real-
ization that they have acquired some loser subsidiaries in the midst of 
the merger boom of the 1960s and have no choice but to divest these 
units and take a capital loss? Although this is true in many cases, it 
does not explain all divestitures as Connelly24 and Vignola25 point out, 
that numerous corporations have sold profitable as well as unprofitable 
units. 
Reasons for Increased Rate of Divestitures 
Corporations divest themselves of subunits for numerous reasons, 
and many times for more than one reason. Forced divestitures, the need 
to reduce corporate debt, management incompatibility, and divestiture to 
finance an acquisition have already been mentioned. But recent develop-
ments in the corporate environment have been construed by several authors 
as reasons for the increased divestment of unprofitable as well as pro-
fitable divisions. 
On such large and lasting transactions such as divestitures, the 
consequences of tax effects are very important. The decision to retain 
or divest often hinges on tax gains or losses. Tax considerations may 
dictate the method of implementing a decision to divest, as well as serve 
. f . d . . h · · f h d · · 26 as a maJor actor in etermining t e correct timing o t e ecision. 
For these reasons, changes in the tax regulations may have a direct 
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effect on the divestment situation. Hershman points out that the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 provided an incentive to divest by allowing a tax-
loss carryback of up to three years to be applied to previous capital 
gains if losses are realized on the sale of a division. Additionally, 
the government promised the tax rebate within 90 days of a company's 
f . 27 filing or it. 
Bentley and Wines discuss the Tax Reform Act of 1976 concerning the 
ability of an acquiring company to utilize the tax benefits of net oper-
f h . d b .d. 28 Th 1 d h f ating losses o t e acquire su si iary. ey cone u e, tat or the 
most part, the changes due to the Act are unfavorable to acquiring firms 
wanting to use the operating losses. However, there are a few benefits 
that serve as incentives to acquire unprofitable units and are therefore 
favorable to divestment activity: The Act increased from three to five 
years the period of time than an operating loss of an acquired subsid-
iary could be applied to the acquiring firm's taxable income generated 
in the future. Additionally, the 1976 Act eliminated the requirement 
that the acquiring firm must continue operating the acquired subsidiary 
in the same trade or business as before acquisition to enable the acquir-
ing firm to utilize the benefits of tax-loss carryovers. This change in 
the federal tax regulation lends more mobility to the assets of the di-
vested unit and gives flexibility to the acquiring firm. 
These tax effects are important aids because the common situation 
for divestiture is still a firm with an unprofitable subsidiary. Re-
search by Duhaime and Patton shows that "elimination of an unprofitable 
unit" is the primary reason for divestments of 60 large industrial 
f . 29 irms. 
Another change in the external environment brought about by the 
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government is the Securities and Exchange Commission's change in corpor-
ate reporting requirements. Since 1971, the SEC has required that di-
versified firms report sales and profits for each "line of business" 
accounting for more than ten percent of total sales and profits. These 
data must be provided in the company's Form 10-K reports to the SEc. 30 
Although no study has focused primarily on the effects of line-of-business 
reporting, former SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen summarizes the possibilities 
by observing that this type of information 
.•. serves a number of purposes. It not only informs the 
investor or his adviser, but also serves as an important 
control on corporate managers by requiring them to justify 
the results of their stewardship. There may be diversified 
companies which are maintaining low profit or money-losing 
operations for reasons which would not be persuasive to 
stockholders or financial analysts, and requiring separate 
disclosure might well result in the improvement or elimina-
tion of the substandard operation to the ultimate benefit 
of the stockholders and the economy generally.31 
Boyle identifies the weaknesses and lack of uniformity in the SEC's 
line-of-business reporting requirements; however, he does note that cor-
porations are voluntarily moving towards more divisional reporting. 32 
Hecht also emphasizes that the corporations that made these types of 
disclosures prior to 1971 reported that it produced a better working re-
33 lationship between management and security analysts. 
Although the SEC's change in required reports has several loopholes, 
it is a step in the right direction for providing meaningful information 
to the investing public. The effect that these disclosures have on the 
divestment situation is by highlighting for the investing public, sub-
optimal performance of divisions or product groups. This tends to force 
management to be more solicitous in decisions to retain an ailing subunit. 
The new rise in interest rates in the money and capital markets have 
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increased the cost of capital to the point where divestiture may be the 
f k . . l 34 cheapest source o waring capita. 
Bradley and Korn (100 p. 52) discuss the recent availability of 
foreign capital seeking direct investment in the United States as greatly 
enhancing the bargaining position of divestors because it enlarges the 
. . f. 35 market of acquiring irms. Connelly also brings out this point and 
offers such examples as the Matsushita Corporation acquiring Motorola 
. ' Q C 1 T 1 · · d · · · 36 Corporations uasar o or e evision ivision. 
Several authors cite a combination of general economic conditions 
that have led to the increase in divestments. Hayes credits inflation 
as pressuring management into divestitures by its effects on declining 
d . I . . 37 profit margins an price earnings ratios. Bradley and Kern also dis-
cuss inflation as a factor that allows acquiring firms to offer prices 
for divestment candidates with premiums of up to 60 percent over market 
value because of the negative effect inflation has on the investing pub-
38 
lie compared to the acquiring company management. 
However, a majority of the literature does not credit the recent 
increase in divestitures directly to external environmental factors as 
to a change in managerial philosophy or strategy. Hershman points out 
that the phenomena of increasing divestments marks an end to a manage-
ment theme she calls "supermanager" and signals the birth of the new 
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concept of "assets management". Connelly agrees with Hershman that 
the old concept of the manager as a problem-solver who, through the use 
of financial control an~ systems management, could succeed with any en-
40 
terprise, has come under recent attack. Connelly believes as does 
Hayes that now the general view is that a good manager realizes his 
limits and stays with the industries in which he is competent. 41 
24 
Several authors add that the change in philosophy favoring divest-
ment is enchanced by a change in management personnel that have no vested 
interest to defend when the possibility of divestment of a prior acquisi-
tion is raised. Therefore, they tend to view the divestment situation 
more objectively. Also, new management may feel a need to demonstrate 
affirmative action by ridding the firm of prior management errors through 
. 42 divestiture. It is interesting to note that a study of three divest-
ment case histories found that in all three cases, a change in top 
management was required before the firms could divest themselves of chron-
ically unprofitable businesses. 43 
New Management Concept 
The new management concept has been referred to as assets management 
or portfolio management whereby, as Hershman states, 
•.• carries maximizing return on investment to the extreme. 
It holds that a division, a product group, subsidiary are all 
subject to the same financial scrutiny and the same buy-or-
sell decision mffing that governs the formation of an invest-
ment portfolio. 
Lovejoy further delineates this portfolio approach as a strategy 
where products or activities 
.•• should be 'turned or rolled over' whenever it is in the 
company's long-run interest of attaining overall objectives. 
Managements holding this view see their mission as that of 
continuously reviewing the portfolio and, when and where 
necessary, disposing of old assets and investing the proceeds 45 
in new ventures which will maximize company profit and growth. 
Another indication of the increased use of portfolio management is 
the consideration of "fit", whereby a collection of product groups, divi-
sions or subsidiaries are considered in light of their complimentary 
characteristics and advantageous interrelatedness. Several authors cite 
this strategy of fit as an important factor d
. 46 in ivestment programs. 
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Duhaime and Patton found that "fit with other product lines or corporate 
goals" was the most commonly used criteria for strategic evaluation of 
d .d 47 divestment can 1 ates. 
This concept of portfolio management is an important consideration 
in the present study and will be discussed later more thoroughly. 
Managerial View .£f Divestment Process 
It is important to note how divestitures were viewed and handled in 
the past in comparison to the present. Up to 1972, many authors noted a 
dearth of objective analysis concerned with the divestment situation. 
Porter noted that in the three case histories of divestments, none of the 
firms analyzed any quantitative data until the decisions to divest had 
48 
effectively been made. Hayes also notes little attempt at careful 
analysis or even application of a company's normal capital budgeting 
49 
process to a divestment proposal. 
Vignola notes that the results of his 1973 survey questionnaire in-
dicates that firms have not considered divestments important enough to 
make specific assignments of responsibility for this activity. Also, 
Vignola concludes that most respondents consider divestment as a reality. 
only at the point where no other viable alternatives exist. 50 
Hayes, Lovejoy, and Porter note a general lack of experience 
or specific skills needed for an effective divestment program. 51 
Recent studies have reported a more favorable attitude of divest-
ment by management and a shift to the use of divestment as a positive 
strategy. Duhaime and Patton in their more recent study found that the 
majority of large firms have assigned specific individuals with divest-
ment responsibility and some have even evolved divestment departments. 
26 
Their study concludes that firms are now using more objective, quantita-
tive analysis in divestment situations and have shifted from "defensively-
motivated" divestment programs characterized by financial distress and 
"last ditch efforts" to "aggressively-motivated" programs focused on pro-
active, strategically-oriented divestments aimed at maximizing firm 
52 
wealth. 
All three authors of the only books written specifically on divest-
ment programs and procedures promote the "normalizing" of the divestment 
53 process. Normalizing divestment means that this activity should be 
considered an integral part of the managerial process and a regular cor-
porate activity equal in normalcy to that of production, marketing, sell-
ing, or planning and acquiring. Duhaime and Patton conclude that a 
significant number of firms are moving in this direction. 
Recently academicians have recognized managements' needs for more 
careful financial analysis and well-planned programs for effective, posi-
tive divestment strategies. To this end, Alberts and McTaggart have re-
cently authored the first scholarly presentation devoted entirely to the 
financial analysis that companies should use to determine whether divest-
d . . . . d 55 ment of a ivision is or is not warrante. 
With the new controversy over possible monopoly in the petroleum 
industry, the government has spawned recent studies on the implications 
of implementing forced divestitures of portions of the large oil firms. 
This controversy has stimulated new interest in the divestiture phenom-
enon resulting in more articles and studies in the forced divestiture. 56 
With the change in management strategy and the recognition of the 
need for skills and knowledge specific to the divestment situation, it is 
expected that more empirical and theoretical research will be forthcoming 
along with more publications in the applied area of divestitures. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
[ntroduction 
This chapter is concerned with the what and how of the analysis used 
:o investigate an interesting question. If corporations are divesting 
:hemselves of subunits that are constantly losing money, then it is logi-
~al that they do so to improve the corporate portfolio's rate of return 
Ln the future. However, corporations are now divesting themselves of vi-
tble subsidiaries and divisions. Some of these units are not only pro-
:itable but are a core activity of the parent firm. What motivates these 
:orporations to rid themselves of these units? Some divestments, to be 
;ure, were motivated by the need for funds and a buyer was willing to pay 
t premium price for the unit. These parent firms may-have investment 
,pportunities with a rate of return superior to the divested activity. 
lut these cases are minimal because the return differential would have 
:o be large enough to make up for the sometimes astronomical costs in-
rolved in a divestment. Sometimes working capital is needed and a tight 
:apital market may make a divestiture of a profitable division appear to 
,e the only way to attain such funds. But this could not explain the 
ia.jority of divestments concerned with a unit with assets worth a large 
Lmount, such as $10 million or more. A divestiture motivated by the need 
:or money could not adequately explain such a magnitude of divestitures 
liscussed in Chapter II. 
30 
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A possible explanation of the motive is that corporations wish to 
reduce the risk position of the corporate portfolio. This is the sub-
ject of the analysis described in this chapter. The measurement of risk 
used in the analysis is discussed along with a formal statement of the 
hypotheses. The sample of divestitures used in the study is delineated 
and the design of the research and statistical analysis is described 
below. 
The Research Problem 
The reasons companies engage in divestment activities are many and 
complex. However, it is assumed that the ultimate purpose of a divest-
ment is to increase the wealth position or reduce the risk of the divest-
ing firm's shareholders. An increase in a firm's market valuation could 
come about as a result of raising the level of expected future earnings 
and/or dividends per share, or lowering the market discount rate. The 
form.er generally involves increasing earnings per share over what they 
otherwise would have been, while the latter involves reducing the risk to 
investors. 
The increase in earnings resulting from divestment is generally ob-
tained if management can invest the proceeds from the sale of a divisiom 
or subsidiary in s·ome activity with an expected rate of return exceeding 
that of the divested division, or at the same return but lower risk. 
This process of increased earnings via divestment does not easily 
lend itself to empirical investigation because it is quite difficult to· 
trace this process due to diversified corporate reporting procedures. 
Also, as noted above, corporate financial reports make it almost impos-
sible for outsiders to ascertain the performance of specific divisions. 
Additionally, this process of earnings accretion via divestment is a 
gradual process and it is difficult to separate and account for other 
possible intervening variables such as general economic conditions, 
change in the capital market, or changes in the level of leverage, to 
o.ame a few. 
The presence of intervening variables also makes it difficult to 
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study risk reduction resulting from divestments. However, by utilizing 
a measurement of the degree of risk associated with the future earnings 
Jf the divested unit in comparison with that of the divesting parent 
:orporation, it is possible to determine if risk reduction is a motive 
for divestment. This motive of risk reduction can be further analyzed 
if the risk measurement of the acquiring firm were also compared. 
[isk Measurement 
The measure of risk employed in this analysis is the beta coeffic-
ient (S) which has been reviewed extensively in current financial litera-
ture. The beta coefficient represents the non-diversifiable or systematic 
risk involved in an individual security or the measure of the volatility 
Jf an individual security's returns relative to market returns. 
Several authors have presented justifications for the use of beta 
as a measure of risk. Babcock justifies the use of beta through the 
:covariance approach". 1 Blume utilizes the "portfolio approach" which 
is more germane to this paper and will be discussed further. 2 
Kohers and Simpson utilized the beta coefficient in a manner very 
?ertinent to this study. In their research, beta was used as a measure 
Jf risk to study financial performance as a motive for mergers. 3 
Beta can be calculated by the ratio of the covariance of the returns 
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of the individual security with the market return divided by the vari-
ance of the market returns. More specifically, beta can be defined as 
follows: 
Beta 
Cov (Kmt' Kjt) 
Var (Kmt) 
(1) 
where: Kmt = the return for the market index in period t, and 
Kjt = the return for security j in period t. 
Blume presents the rationale.of beta as a measure of risk utilizing 
a portfolio approach. He illustrates that as a portfolio of securities 
becomes more diversified, the diversification effect of eliminating non-
systematic risk proceeds rapidly so that beta becomes a measure of risk 
for a diversified portfolio. And the beta of an individual stock, as it 
contributes to the value of the portfolio beta, is a measure of risk for 
that stock. The larger the value of a security's beta, the more risk 
the security will contribute to a portfolio. 4 
A derivative of this under portfolio theory is that the subtraction 
of an individual security from a diversified portfolio will lower the 
risk of the portfolio if the security's beta coefficient is greater than 
the portfolio beta coefficient. 
As noted in the literature review, many corporate managers have 
applied the portfolio concept to their organizations, whereas corporate 
divisions and/or subsidiaries are viewed as individual securities in an 
investment portfolio and are subjected to the same financial scrutiny. 
This study will apply this concept to the divestment phenomena to ascer-
tain if the possible improvement of financial performance through risk 
reduction serves as a motive for divestment. 
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Statement of Hypotheses 
If a division or subsidiary of a corporation is view~d as a security 
or asset of a corporate portfolio and the beta coefficient can be derived 
for each division and the corporate portfolio as a whole, then the risk 
position of the corporation can be reduced through divestiture of a divi-
sion if the beta for the division is greater than the corporate portfolio 
beta. Therefore, if risk reduction is a motive for divestiture, then: 
where 
s >' s D S 
8 = the beta coefficient for the divested division 
D or subsidiary, and 
SS = the beta coefficient for the selling corporation. 
[1] 
By comparing the betas of divested units to betas of selling, parent 
corporations, it is possible to test this hypothesis. 
This portfolio concept of asset management may be investigated fur-
ther by comparing the betas of the selling corporation (S firm) and di-
vested unit (D firm) to the beta of the corporation that acquires the 
divested unit (A firm). This is similar to the study by Kohers and 
Simpson. They compared the beta coefficient of acquiring and acquired 
firms in a merger. Their results revealed that there was no significant 
difference between the two betas at the .10 level. 5 However, this sample 
consists of firms acquiring divisions or subsidiaries from other firms, 
which is a different phenomenon that most merger studies. It is suggested 
that in general, corporations that acquire divested divisions, subsidiar-
ies, or product lines are motivated by financial improvement through other 
means than risk reduction. As stated earlier, it appears logical that 
management would purchase a subsidiary from another corporation with the 
expectation that they can do a better job with the unit. Therefore, it is 
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hypothesized that acquiring firms purchase divested units to increase the 
wealth position of their shareholders through improvement in their rate 
of return; in other words, by purchasing a divested unit with an equal or 
greater risk position than in their own corporation. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is that the following will obtain 
for all acquiring firms and divested units: 
[2] 
where: BA= the beta coefficient of the acquiring corporation 
of the divested unit. 
Divestiture Sample 
The sample used in this analysis consisted of thirty divestitures. 
The earliest divestiture included in this study occurred in April 1952 
and the latest in May 1977. The sample divestitures were chosen from 
the list of manufacturing and mining companies acquired with assets of 
$10 million or more from 1948 to 1978 contained in the Statistical Report 
~ Mergers and Acquisitions by the Federal Trade Commission. 6 This list 
also contains one of the few authoritative listing of divestitures. The 
sample selection criteria consisted of the following: Both the buying 
and selling companies had to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
continuously for five years prior to the date of divestiture; the divested 
unit must have been identified by at least the first three digits of the 
Standard Industrial Classification code; and the buying and selling firms 
must not have made a major divestment (consisting of a subsidiary or div-
ision with $10 million or more in assets) within.the five years prior to 
the observed divestiture. The first criterion was used so beta values, 
based upon 60 monthly observations over a five-year period, starting 59 
months prior to the investment and continuing up to and including the 
month of divestment, could be calculated. The last criterion was used 
to abort the difficult task of sorting the risk effects of multiple 
divestments. 
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The reason the divested unit must have been identified by at least 
the first three digits of the SIC code was to enable a subsample of firms 
similar in SIC code to be gathered to represent the divested unit. Since 
it is very rare for a divested unit to be listed on any stock exchange, 
a beta value is impossible to obtain. Therefore, a group of firms for 
each divested unit was formed on the basis of similarity of SIC codes and 
appropriate listing on the NYSE to compute a proxy beta value for the di-
vested unit, The majority of proxy samples were formed on the basis of 
the same first three SIC code digits while only threegroups were formed 
on the basis of two digits and six groups were formed under the same four 
digits. The size of the proxy groups ranged from seven firms to as large 
as 32 firms. The mean for each of the 60 monthly market returns from 
every company in the representative group was computed to calculate the 
proxy betas for the divested unit. Table I lists all buying, selling, 
and divested firms in the sample. 
Research Design 
As noted by Blume, no economic variable including the beta coeffi-
cient is constant over time. 7 For this reasons, 60 observations of 
monthly stock market returns were analyzed for the buying and selling 
firms and proxy groups representing the divested firms. The CRSP data 
files developed by the Center for Research in Seucirty Prices of the 
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, were used to obtain 
TABLE I 
SELECTED DIVESTED FIRMS WITH DIVESTING AND ACQUIRING 
FIRMS WITH SIC CODES GROUPED BY DIVESTITURE 

































and SIC Code 
Divested Company 
and SIC Code 
Owens-Illinois Corp. 3211 American Coating 
Renolds Metals Co. 3350 Richmond Rad. 
Libby-Owens Ford, Inc. 3210 Libby Co. 
Dayco Corp. 3010 
LTV Corp 
Warner Lambert Co. 
Merritt Chapman 
and Scott Corp. 
Sears Roebuck & Co. 
Archer Daniels 
Midland Oil Co. 
Borg Warner Corp. 
General Foods Corp. 
w. R. Grace & Co. 






3010 Dayco Division 
3720 Vought Industries 
2834 Standard Oil (Ind) 
1629 Devoe and Raynolds 
5311 Warwick Electronics 
2045 Archer-Daniels 
Chemicals 
3561 Norge Co. 
2099 SOS Products 
2819 Miller Breweries 
2011 Armour Meats. 
2823 Champlin-Pont 
3424 Eversharp Div. 
3634 F.E. Computers Div. 
3334 Kaiser Jeep Div. 
2834 Riker Labs 
J. R. McDermott 3533 Transocean Oil 
LTV Corp. 3728 Wilson Phar. & 
and Chemicals 
Colorado Intst. Corp. 4922 Colorado Mfg. 
Riegel Paper Corp. 2641 Riegel Div. 
Stanley Wks. 3429 Amerock Div. 
Papercraft Corp. 2648 CPS Industries 
Rapid-American Corp. 5311 Int'l Playtex 
Continental Tel. Corp. 4811 ViJar Co. 
Airco Corp. 2813 Viking Div. 
Rorer Group, Inc. 2834 Amchem Div. 
Apache Corp. 1311 Apexco, Inc. 
Ferro Corp. 2899 Fiber Glass Div. 
lluying Company 
and SIC Code 
2612 Gair Robert, Inc. 





301X Firestone Tire 3011 
3791 Divco-Wayne Corp. 3710 
2911 Pro-Phy-Lac 3981 
2850 Celanese Corp. 2823 
365X Whirlpool Corp. 3633 
287X Ashland Oil 2911 
363X Fedders Corp. 3580 
3291 Miles Laboratory 2834 
2082 Philip Morris, Inc. 2111 
2011 Greyhound Corp. 6711 
2911 Union Pacific R.R. 4011 
3424 Warner Lambert Co. 2834 
3573 Honeywell, Inc. 3573 
3711 American Motors Corp. 3711 
2834 Minnesota Mining & Mfg.2641 
1311 Esmark Corp. 2011 
2891 American Can Co. 3411 
3821 General Signal Corp. 3622 
2531 Federal Paper Board 2651 
3429 Anchor Hocking Corp. 3229 
2648 Arcata Corp. 2751 
2342 Esmark Corp. 2011 
3674 TRW Inc. 
3462 Quanex Corp. 
2819 Union Carbide Corp. 
3711 Natomas Co. 









the individual common stock returns and the market portfolio returns. 
Specifically, 60 monthly common stock returns including dividends were 
regressed on equal-weighted market portfolio returns with dividends to 
obtain beta coefficients for all sample companies. The 60-month period, 
covering five years prior to the divestiture up to and including the 
month of divestment, was ample margin to avoid the discounting effects 
due to rumors of a coming divestiture and/or the announcement of the 
intention to divest. 
There were a total of 110 divestitures listed by the Federal Trade 
Commission report on mergers and acquisitions from which the sample of 
30 were drawn. The size of the sample, with its corresponding inherent 
biases, is attributed to the stringent criteria applied to measure the 
systematic risk; namely, counting only divestitures with a five-year list-
ing on the NYSE and with firms that have only executed one major dives-
titure during that period. The smallness of the sample is partially 
counterbalanced by lack of overlapping effects on measuring systematic 
risk caused by other divestitures within the same corporation. However, 
an undetermined bias may be attributed to the fact the sample was not 
controlled for mergers and acquisitions that may have been accomplished 
by the firms during the five-year period which could affect beta values 
significantly. 
Table II lists the beta coefficients for the buying, selling and 
divested companies grouped by divestitures. In ten divestitures, proxy 
samples were not formed for divested units because the SIC codes were 
exactly the same as either the buying or selling corporation in the di-
vestiture. Statistical analysis included only those ten cases when the 
buying company was compared to the ·selling company. Statistical tests 
TABLE II 
BETA COEFFICIENT VALUES FOR BUYING, SELLING 
































































































































1The divestiture number refers to the divestitures similarly 
numbered in Table I, page 35. 
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were done on the samples with and without these ten divestitures and were 
found not to effect the results. 
Statistical Analysis 
Many studies on differences in sample characteristics focus on the 
arithmetic mean of each sample. The potential drawback with this method 
is that there may be extreme values in the sample which could easily af-
fect the sample's arithmetic mean. One way of circumventing this problem 
is to employ a paired-difference test. The paired-difference test in 
this analysis examined up to 80 sets of data instead of six. This parti-
cular approach is believed to yield more information about the mean dif-
ference in the risk positions between selling, buying and divested firms, 
rather than just testing for equality of each firm's risk measurement. 
The Statistical Analysis System (SAS) was used for the data analysis 
which is unique in producing an exact significance level for each statis-
tical test result as annotated in the results illustrated in Table III. 
Another test was run to analyze the variances of the buying, selling 
and divested firms' mean beta coefficients. A simple T-test was used and 
SAS also provided an F (folded) statistic to compute the test for equality 
of the two variances of the compared group means. These statistics do not 
provide as meaningful results as the paired-difference test. This is be-
cause the purpose of the analysi~ is to investigate each divestiture sep-
arately as concerns differences in the measure of systematic risk. The 
T-test and F-test is not as sensitive to the individuality involved in 
each divestiture in the relationship between the selling, buying and di-
vested firms and the economic climate and nuances of the stock market 
during the five-year period of observation as the paired-difference test 
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provides. 
The empirical results reveal that the measurements of systematic 
risk were significantly greater for the divested units than the buying 
firms under the paired-difference test. An analysis of the individual 
divestments reveais that the divested unit risk position exceeded that 
of the buying firm 70 percent of the time. However, the T-test and 
F-test disagree in their results. The T-test shows no significant dif-
ference while the F-test shows that the null hypothesis cannot be ac-
cepted. The paired-difference test is the important test and its 
results will stand. 
The paired-difference test and the F-test show no significant differ-
ence between the risk positions of the selling firms and their divested 
units. The T-test does not show significant equality. In observance of 
the paired-difference results, the null hypothesis is accepted and the 
first hypothesis that the risk position of the divested unit is greater 
than its parents, selling firm is rejected. 
An additional comparison of the beta values of the selling and buy-
ing companies was done to investigate the reliability of the proxy beta 
for the divested units. The reason for this analysis is due to the 
limited validity of the proxy beta. It is impossible to derive a beta 
coefficient for each division or subsidiary because these units are 
usually wholly-owned by the parent corporation and not traded on any 
stock exchange so that market price data are not available. Therefore, 
a proxy beta for the divested unit was derived as the average beta of 
all corporations listed on the NYSE with similar industry characteristics. 
This proxy beta does have several conceptual difficulties concerning its 
use as a meaningful representative. While not free of potential bias, 
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this proxy beta was used because it is the best possible surrogate mea-
sure under the circumstances. It should be noted that other studies 
have utilized proxy financial measurements based on similarity of SIC 
codes. 8 This type of data is considered a good substitute because of 
the presence of strong factors that commonly affect all firms within a 
specific industry such as market variances and changes in the economic 
climate surrounding an industry. 
Table III shows that the paired-difference test indicates that the 
selling firms' betas were greater than the buying firms'. This gives 
added weight to the representatives of proxy risk measurements for the 
divested units. However, this conclusion must be accepted with caution 
because both the F-test and T-test agree in showing no difference between 
the means of the selling and buying firm groups that can be considered 
significant. 
The disagreement between test results was not investigated closely 
due to the fact that the paired-difference test was the major test while 
the F-test and T-test are ancillary to the purpose of the study. The 
small sample sizes could attribute much to the disagreement by being 
more sensitive to extreme values in addition to the rather large stand-
~rd errors. 








STATISTICAL RESULTS OF PAIRED-DIFFERENCE TEST 
AND T-TEST PROCEDURES 
Means of Beta Values 
Buying Companies .8732260 
Divested Companies: 1.0548166 
Selling Comeanies: 1.0832606 
Paired-Diffence Test 
Calculated Level of Statistical 










Tested Firms N 
Buying Firm 27 
Divested Firm 27 
For null hypothesis: 
significance level 
Tested Firms N 
Selling Firm 30 
Divested Firm 30 
For null hypothesis: 
significance level= 
Tested Firms N 
Buying Firm 30 
Selling Firm 30 
For null hypothesis: 
3.00 .0058 26 Divested unit 
Beta exceeded 
buying firm 
Beta 19 times 
out of 27 di_: 
vestitures 
.31 • 7625 22 Divested ·unit 
B.e ta exceeded 
selling firm 
Beta 12 times 
out of 23 di-
vestitures 
2.16 .0393 29 Selli-ng fiI'III 
Beta exceeded 
buying firm 
Beta 18 times 
out of 30 di-
vestitures 
T-Test 
Standard Standard DF T Value and Significance 
Deviation Error Level for Null Hypothesis 
.25198 .04849 52 2. 71 at 
.29308 .05640 .0009 level 
F = 1.35 with 26 and 26 degrees of freedom 
.446 
Standard Standard DF T Value and Significance 
Deviation Error Level for Null Hypothesis 
.4420 .0922 44 .3447 at 
.2667 .0556 .757 level 
F = 2.75 with 22 and 22 degrees of freedoin 
.0216 
Standard Standard DF T Value and Significance 
Deviation Error Level for Null Hypothesis 
.2467 .0450 58 2.3857 at 
.4143 .0786 .0203 level 
F = 2.82 with 29 and 29 degrees of freedom 
signifi~ance level= .0067 
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1Guilford C. Babcock, "A Note on Justifying Beta as a Measure of 
Risk", Journal of Finance, Vol. 27 (June 1972), p. 700. 
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3Theodor Kohers and W. Gary Simpson, "Financial Performance: Motive 
for Corporate Mergers", University of Michigan Business Review, Vol. 30 
(July 1978), pp. 11-14. 
4 Blume, pp. 2-5. 
5Kohers and Simpson, p. 14. 
6Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Statistical Report 
~ Mergers and Acquisitions. 
7 Blume, p. 6. 
8R. L. Conn, "Acquired Firm Performance After Conglomerate Merger", 
Southern Economic Journal (October 1976), pp. 1170-1171; Robert A. Hau-
gen and Terence C. Langetieg, "An Empirical Test for Synergism in Merger", 




If the ultimate purpose of divestiture is to improve financial per-
formance, then the analysis reveals that risk reduction does not serve 
as a motive for divestiture or as a method to increase the divesting 
firm's market valuation for the sample selected. 
If the above assumed purpose of divestiture holds true, then cor-
porate management's motive for divestiture can be considered to be in-
creasing future expected corporate earnings through investment of the 
divestment proceeds into areas of activity of a greater rate of return. 
This could be accomplished by several methods discussed above. Such as: 
using the funds to acquire other business units, increasing investment 
in present activities, or possibly lowering the level of costly short-
term debt or total leverage to decrease the cost of capital to the cor-
poration. 
The empirical results also show that buying companies in the sample 
consistently purchased divested product lines, subsidiaries or divisions 
of other corporations that exhibited significantly greater risk positions 
than that of the buying company portfolio. This is assumed to be in ex-
pectation of earning an appropriate required rate of return. 
The comparison between buying and selling firms indicated that buy-
ing corporations with a lower systematic risk may be in a better position 
to acquire the product line, subsidiary, or division than the higher 
risk-oriented parent corporation is to maintain the unit within their 
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organization. These conclusions, unfortunately, must be considered with 
caution. The problem of the small sample size hampers not only the 
question of representatives of the population of all divestments but 
hampers the validity of the statistical analysis as well. 
The conceptual problems of using mean beta coefficients of firms 
with the same SIC code as the divested unit is obvious. in the first 
place, the SIC code was matched by only the first three digits in a ma-
jority of cases. Secondly, the SIC. code system involves much arbitrary 
classification that cannot possibly capture all the intricacies and in-
dividualities of many special industries. Thirdly, one must assume in 
this study that all proxy corporations are affected exactly the same, in 
the whole, by economic and market conditions as the divested unit. Also, 
these proxy companies are complete organizations whereas the divested unit 
may not be self-sufficient and may not have to consider how its perform-
ance will be judged by the market. Finally, this procedure is somewhat 
insensitive to the fact that the divested unit may be close to failure 
and a singular situation not represented by the mean betas of the proxy 
firms. 
This study is conceptual in nature. In the dynamic area of busi-
ness acquisitions and divestments, management may not consider or even 
have the capabilities to analyze the systematic risk of the portfolio 
and what the division would contribute to this type of risk position. 
While this study is far from being an extensive investigation into the 
divestiture phenomenon, it does serve as being the first known attempt 
to investigate divestitures under the portfolio concept by utilizing 
empirical research techniques. This study should therefore be viewed 
in light of current research and will hopefully stimulate more empirical 
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?search in this area. 
A possible study that could contribute more useful and reliable re-
1lts would combine other measurements of financial and operating per-
>rmance such as net profit, total asset turnover, or operating rate of 
?turn with the beta coefficient of the acquiring, selling, and divested 
Lrms. Also a series of case studies of divestitures using empirical 
~chniques would be very useful to practitioners and academicians alike. 
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